This country-specific Q&A provides an overview of Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters laws and regulations applicable in United States.
In signing the Hague Judgments Convention, the Unites States did not make any reservations to the treaty. Reservations, however, could yet be made if the United States proceeds with ratification of that treaty.
A map of the current status of states which have adopted a Uniform Act is available here. In February 2024, a bill to adopt the 2005 Uniform Act was introduced in the Kentucky General Assembly, but this bill remains pending at the time of this publication.
Although the 1962 and 2005 Uniform Acts generally provide for similar mechanisms and guidelines for the enforcement of foreign civil monetary judgments, there are some important differences. For example, the 2005 Uniform Act requires the party seeking recognition of the foreign judgment to show that the judgment is subject to the 2005 Uniform Act while the debtor party bears the burden of proof to establish grounds for non-recognition. Meanwhile, the 1962 Uniform Act, by comparison, does not address the burden of proof. See 2005 Uniform Act § 3. In addition, the 2005 Uniform Act establishes a statute of limitations for the enforcement of foreign judgments, while the 1962 Uniform Act does not specify a statute of limitations. See id. § 9.
As an initial matter, U.S. courts distinguish between the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment: (1) a foreign judgment must first be recognized and (2) only upon recognition, can a judgment be enforced against specific assets. Though recognition and enforcement typically proceed in sequence, there may be reasons for a party to seek only recognition of a foreign judgment, such as for res judicata purposes in an ongoing U.S. proceeding. The Restatement and the Uniform Acts generally provide that, to be enforceable in a U.S. court, a foreign civil judgment for a sum of money must be: (i) final; (ii) conclusive, and (iii) enforceable in its country of origin. See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 481; 1962 Uniform Act § 2; 2005 Uniform Act § 3(a)(2). As noted above, the common-law approach under Hilton v. Guyot also assesses whether the foreign proceeding comported with principles of due process and full and fair trials. In this context, a judgment is “final” when it is not subject to any further proceedings in the rendering foreign court other than execution, though it may still be subject to appeals in other courts in the country of origin. See Restatement (Fourth) § 481 cmt. e. “Conclusive” means the judgment has been given effect as between the parties as to their respective legal rights and obligations. “[E]nforceable” means that all procedures of the rendering jurisdiction to ensure that the judgment debtor complies with the judgment are available to the judgment creditor to assist in collection of the judgment. See Restatement (Fourth) § 481 cmt. d. Beyond these basic requirements, state law may specify additional criteria. For example, New York requires an authenticated copy of the foreign judgment, and an English translation of the judgment accompanied by an affidavit by the translator. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 2101(b), 5402(a). The Uniform Acts apply only to foreign civil judgments for a sum of money. However, the Uniform Acts do not expressly prohibit the recognition of other types of civil judgments, and courts sometimes recognize other forms of judgments under the common law as a matter of comity. See 1962 Uniform Act § 7; 2005 Uniform Act § 1; see also, e.g., Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 2004 WL 155116, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2004) (holding that a Bermuda declaratory judgment is “entitled to full recognition and effect”). On the other hand, U.S. courts have long declined to recognize or enforce foreign judgments related to penal laws, taxes, or fines, even under common law. See Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations Law § 489. In this context, a penal judgment is one whose “purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice of the state” rather than “to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act.” Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892). A “tax judgment is a judgment in favor of a foreign state or one of its subdivisions based on a claim for an assessment of a tax, whether imposed in respect of income, property, transfer of wealth, or any other transaction.” Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations Law § 489 cmt. c.
The procedure for recognition and enforcement varies by state, with some states requiring only that the judgment be filed with the court clerk, and others requiring commencement of a new civil action. Additionally, some states provide for an expedited procedure that is designed to fast-track the recognition and enforcement process. In New York, for example, a foreign judgment may be enforced through a “Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint” proceeding. Under this expedited procedure, a party seeking to enforce a foreign judgment needs to file a summons, a motion for summary judgment and supporting papers. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 3213; 5303(b). In the absence of a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment, the New York court will resolve the motion without time-consuming discovery or trial. As discussed below, any petition or complaint to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment must also demonstrate the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction over the action and personal jurisdiction (either in personam or in rem). In addition to starting a new action, a party to an existing U.S. action may raise recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment as part of a counterclaim, cross-claim, or affirmative defense. See 2005 Uniform Act § 6(b).
Broadly speaking, the recognition and enforcement process can take as little as 6-12 months in the most straightforward cases. More complicated cases involving parallel proceedings, extensive briefing and expert submissions, discovery and/or hearings, appeals, etc. can take multiple years before final resolution.
As noted above, some states (e.g., New York) do provide parties the option to utilize expedited procedures that may reduce the overall amount of time required to resolve the case.
Yes, interim remedies, such as prejudgment attachment, may be available to parties seeking recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in certain circumstances. In New York, for example, under C.P.L.R. § 6201(5), a party seeking enforcement of a foreign country “judgment which qualifies for recognition” in New York can obtain prejudgment attachment of the judgment-debtor’s property within New York. However, the petitioner must demonstrate that there is a cause of action against defendant, that it is probable that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, that one or more statutory grounds for attachment are met, and the amount demands exceeds all known counterclaims. Notably, pre-judgment attachment generally is not available if the judgment-debtor is a foreign state or an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state (such as a state-owned entity) within the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in the absence of an explicit waiver. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609, 1610(b), 1610(d).
Section 9 of the 2005 Uniform Act provides expressly that “[a]n action to recognize a foreign country judgment must be commenced within the earlier of the time during which the foreign country judgment is effective in the foreign country or 15 years from the date that the foreign country judgment became effective in the foreign country.” As noted, the 1962 Uniform Act does not provide a statute of limitations. In practice, limitation periods vary on a state-by-state basis and even Uniform Act jurisdictions may adopt different limitation periods under state law. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Wiley, 145 So. 3d 946 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (applying 20-year limitations period to foreign judgment in Florida, a 1962 Uniform Act jurisdiction); Costaras v. Costaras, 511 P.3d 568 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022) (noting general rule of 4-year limitation period for enforcing foreign judgment in Arizona, a 2005 Uniform Act jurisdiction).
Discretionary Grounds for Non-Recognition:
The 2005 Uniform Act adds two additional discretionary grounds for non-recognition:
In addition, the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 484—and a minority of states which have not adopted the Uniform Acts—recognize lack of reciprocity as a discretionary ground for non-recognition. In other words, courts may deny recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment if the courts of the underlying jurisdiction would not recognize a comparable U.S. judgment.
Here are several examples of U.S. courts refusing to recognize foreign judgments. See, e.g., Kaupthing ehf. v. Bricklayers and Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund Liquidation Portfolio, 291 F. Supp. 3d 21, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2017) (refusing to enforce foreign judgment because the Icelandic court that issued judgment lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant); Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, 2004 WL 5615657, at *2 (C.D. Ca. Nov. 22, 2004) (noting that “both the Ninth and Second Circuits have refused to enforce foreign judgments that were rendered under systems that failed to provide impartial tribunals”).
Although less commonly litigated, another possible ground for non-enforcement is that the underlying judgment has been satisfied (the respondent alleges that the judgment has been paid in full) thereby mooting the U.S. enforcement action. See, e.g., Servipronto De El Salvador, S.A. v. McDonald’s Corp., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60584, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020) (dismissing an enforcement action as moot because the U.S. court’s “only function is to domesticate” the relevant judgment from El Salvador “so that it can be enforced, but that [j]udgment ha[d] already been paid in El Salvador.”).
U.S. courts generally avoid revisiting the merits underlying a foreign judgment. This deferential practice is rooted in principles of comity, including the interest in U.S. judgments receiving similar treatment abroad. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 670 (2005) (“[W]here ‘comity of this nation’ calls for recognition of a judgment rendered abroad, ‘the merits of the case should not . . . be tried afresh . . . upon the mere assertion . . . that the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.’”) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895)). In practice, U.S. courts sometimes conduct a substantive inquiry into the foreign proceedings and/or underlying judgment to the extent necessary if certain grounds for non-recognition arise. For instance, several of the grounds for non-recognition under the 2005 Uniform Act concern the integrity or due process afforded to the defendant in the underlying proceeding. This inquiry therefore contemplates that the U.S. court examines at least some facets of the foreign court’s procedural and substantive rulings.
Yes, U.S. courts will only enforce foreign judgments if the foreign court exercised proper personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over the defendant. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895); 2005 Uniform Act § 4(b)(2); 1962 Uniform Act § 4(a)(2). U.S. courts assessing whether the foreign court had proper jurisdiction will look generally to whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with U.S. due process standards. See, e.g., Commissions Import Export, S.A. v. Republic of Congo, 118 F. Supp. 3d 220, 226-27 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding that under the D.C. Uniform Act, “personal jurisdiction should only be accepted as validly asserted if it comports with the internal law of the state where recognition is sought and if constitutional minimums are met”); see also Falcon Mfg. (Scarborough) Ltd v. Ames, 53 Misc.2d 332, 336 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1967) (declining to recognize a Canadian judgment because the “requirements of due process [were] lacking”); Kaupthing ehf. v. Bricklayers and Trowel Trades Intl. Pension Fund Liquidation Portfolio, 291 F. Supp. 3d 21, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2017) (refusing to enforce an Icelandic judgment because the issuing court lacked specific personal jurisdiction).
As discussed above, U.S. courts will not enforce a foreign judgment if it does not comport with traditional notions of due process. Beyond this threshold requirement, U.S. courts generally do not impose strict requirements on the way in which the defendant was served with the proceedings, so long as the defendant received due notice of the existence of the action (even if the local service procedures were not strictly followed). See Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations Law § 484 cmt. c. U.S. courts may recognize and enforce default judgments rendered by foreign courts, to the extent that the exercise of jurisdiction by that foreign court was not unreasonable.
Yes, the Restatement and the Uniform Acts expressly distinguish between mandatory and discretionary grounds for recognition and enforcement. Please refer to our response to Question #11 which describes these grounds.
Yes, U.S. courts recognize and enforce only certain types of foreign judgments. U.S. courts generally will not recognize or enforce foreign judgments concerning the penal laws of another country, or judgments involving tax, fines, or other penalties. See 2005 Uniform Act § 3(b); 1962 Uniform Act § 1. Penal Judgments: The Restatement defines a “penal judgment” as “one whose ‘purpose is to punish an offence against the public justice of the State’ rather than ‘to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act.’” Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations Law § 489 cmt. b (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892)). This means that foreign judgments for fines, penalties, and forfeitures are typically considered “penal judgments” in this context. By contrast, judgments in favor of a foreign state and arising out of a civil controversy (e.g., contract or tort claims) generally are not considered “penal” and may be recognized and enforced by U.S. courts if the criteria are satisfied. Multiple and Punitive Damages: As to multiple or punitive damages, the Restatement does not expressly bar recognition and enforcement of judgments providing such relief, “[s]o long as the purpose of the judgment is to afford a private remedy.” Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations Law § 489 cmt. b. Defamation Judgments: The federal Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (“SPEECH”) Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05, precludes the recognition and enforcement of foreign defamation judgments unless: (i) “the defamation law applied in the foreign court’s adjudication provided at least as much protection for freedom of speech and press in that case as would be provided by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by the constitution and law of the State in which the domestic court is located;” or (ii) “even if the defamation law applied in the foreign court’s adjudication did not provide as much protection for freedom of speech and press as the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of the State, the party opposing recognition or enforcement of that foreign judgment would have been found liable for defamation by a domestic court applying the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of the State in which the domestic court is located.” See also Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations Law § 481.
Yes. Finality is a prerequisite to recognition and enforcement. However, a foreign judgment may be considered final, conclusive, and enforceable even though it is subject to appeal in its country of origin. See Restatement (Fourth) § 481 cmt. e; see also 1962 Uniform Act § 2; 2005 Uniform Act § 8. Where an appeal is pending in the foreign jurisdiction, U.S. courts will often stay the U.S. enforcement action until the foreign appeals are resolved. See, e.g., Krineta Enters. Co. v. Lavidas, 22 N.Y.S.3d 137 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2015) (granting stay pending appeal in Greek court).
Yes. There generally is a right under U.S. procedural rules to appeal a final decision recognizing or enforcing a foreign judgment in the United States.
Yes, post-judgment interest may be claimed on the judgment sum in the United States. For interest that accrues on the judgment sum between the entry of judgment in the foreign country and the recognizing decision in the United States, courts typically will grant interest at the rate applicable in the foreign jurisdiction under the foreign judgment. See, e.g., Kotbi v. Najjar, 213 N.Y.S.3d 36 (App. Div. 2024) (concluding that the lower court should have enforced a Moroccan judgment in its entirety by awarding prejudgment interest at the rate specified by the Moroccan court, rather than at New York’s statutory prejudgment rate). After entry of judgment in the United States, the applicable interest rate typically will be based on the law of enforcing forum (U.S. state or federal), and not the foreign jurisdiction. See, e.g., Vinogradov v. Sokolova, 77 Misc. 3d 284 (S. Ct. N. Y. 2022) (“Ordinarily, in a proceeding to enforce a foreign judgment, interest that has accrued on that judgment following its entry is assessed based on ‘the law of the forum’—i.e., New York.”). However, the applicable interest rate varies by state and the circumstances of the particular case. Courts have the discretion to impose a different rate than the rate provided by U.S. or state statute, particularly where the parties have contracted expressly for a different post-judgment interest rate, so long as such a rate does not constitute a “penalty.”
There is no federal requirement that a foreign judgment be converted into U.S. dollars for the purposes of recognition and enforcement, but some states do require conversion. For example, Minnesota requires that a foreign-money claims “must be docketed in United States dollars.” See Minn. Stat. § 548.46(g). Even if not expressly required under state law, many courts convert foreign judgments into U.S. dollars. See, e.g., Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Federal Government of Nigeria, 932 F. Supp. 2d 153, 158 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting that conversion of “foreign currency amounts into dollars at judgment is the norm, rather than the exception” and holding that plaintiff was entitled to conversion of the foreign currency portions of its British arbitral award into dollars). As to what exchange rate applies, courts adopt various approaches depending on the jurisdiction and particular circumstances of the case. U.S. courts often will “convert a judgment denominated in foreign currency to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate prevailing on the date of the U.S. judgment granting recognition or enforcement” (the so-called “judgment day” rule). Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations § 490(2). However, courts sometimes apply the “breach day” rule, where the exchange rate is the rate applicable on the date the foreign judgment was issued. See Cont’l Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, 932 F. Supp. 153, 158-62 (D.D.C. 2013) (applying “breach day” rule in a proceeding confirming an arbitration award and determining that the relevant date was the day the award was issued). Additional complexities can arise where the originating jurisdiction has experienced economic instability and currency fluctuations. See, e.g., Diaz v. Galopy Corp. Int’l, N.V., 79 N.Y.S.3d 494 (Sup. Ct.) (noting that the determination of “the rate of exchange representing that equivalent [U.S. dollar] value becomes problematic due to the political climate in the original jurisdiction” and ordering additional briefing on the applicable exchange rate for a Venezuelan judgment given uncertainties regarding the “true market rate for exchanging bolivars to dollars”).
Attorneys’ fees and other costs typically are not recoverable in foreign-judgment-recognition and enforcement actions except when provided for by contract between the parties or expressly under the foreign judgment. For example, in instances where the relevant foreign judgment stipulated that the defendants would indemnify plaintiffs for costs, including “costs of collection,” a U.S. court held that the costs of enforcement could be recovered. See D’Amico Dry D.A.C. v. Primera Maritime (Hellas) Ltd., 433 F.Supp.3d 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); see also Capital Bank of Jordan v. Alaeddin, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233832 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2023) (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment to recognize a Jordanian judgment, which included an award of attorneys’ fees).
Yes, U.S. courts generally permit third-party litigation funding, though certain limitations (e.g., disclosure requirements) may apply on a state-by-state basis. In addition to third party funding of claims or enforcement proceedings, we have observed a growing market for the securitization of judgments, as well as specialized insurance policies that protect against the risk of not recovering on a final judgment.
We will continue to watch whether more states, like Kentucky, take steps towards adopting a version of the Uniform Acts. Although state-by-state idiosyncrasies at the margin are likely to persist, increased adoption of the Uniform Acts could bring more consistency and predictability to foreign-judgment recognition and enforcement proceedings across the United States. We also anticipate a growing trend of U.S. courts grappling with conflicting foreign judgments, particularly in the context of increasing numbers of disputes involving multinational technology companies. In particular, we have seen the rise of potential anti-suit injunctions in multi-jurisdictional disputes involving patent and other intellectual-property and technology-related claims. As a hypothetical example, a U.S. court could face a decision of whether to recognize and enforce a judgment entered in Country A that violates an anti-suit injunction entered in Country B. Such circumstances would require the U.S. court to undertake a more extensive substantive inquiry into the foreign proceedings, which in turn could cause tensions in the current comity-based framework for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. See generally, Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations Law § 484 cmt. f (“If a foreign judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment, a court in the United States has discretion to recognize the later judgment, to recognize the earlier judgment, or to recognize neither.”).
The United States signed the Hague Choice of Courts Convention in January 2009. However, the United States has not ratified this agreement, and the prospects for future ratification appear unlikely. While some academics and practitioners proposed a federal implementing statute that would implement the Choice of Court Convention, akin to the way the Federal Arbitration Act served to implement the New York Convention, others took the position that the Convention should be implemented through a uniform law and supplemented by a federal statute, which would leave the precise contours of implementation more in the discretion of states. No consensus has been reached, and momentum towards ratification has apparently stalled for now.
The United States signed the Hague Judgments Convention on March 2, 2022, but has not yet ratified it (meaning the agreement has not entered force as to the United States). Some observers have noted that given the challenges faced in ratifying the Hague Choice of Courts Convention, which the United States signed in 2009 but has not ratified, it remains unclear whether the Hague Judgments Convention will ultimately be ratified (and this process could take multiple years if it proceeds at all).